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Abstract. When moving from known-input security to chosen-input se-
curity, some generic attacks sometimes become possible and must be dis-
carded by a specic set of rules in the threat model. Similarly, common
practices consist of xing security systems, once an exploit is discovered,
by adding a specic rule to thwart it. To study feasibility, we investigate
a new security notion: security against undetectable attacks. I.e., attacks
which cannot be ruled out by any specic rule based on the observable be-
havior of the adversary. In this model, chosen-input attacks must specify
inputs which are indistinguishable from the ones in known-input attacks.
Otherwise, they could be ruled out, in theory.
Although non-falsiable, this notion provides interesting results: for any
primitives based on symmetric encryption, message authentication code
(MAC), or pseudorandom function (PRF), known-input security is equiv-
alent to this restricted chosen-input security in Minicrypt. Otherwise, any
separation implies the construction of a public-key cryptosystem (PKC):
for a known-input-secure primitive, any undetectable chosen-input at-
tack transforms the primitive into a PKC.
In this paper, we develop the notion of security based on open rules. We
show the above results. We revisit the notion of related-key security of
block ciphers to illustrate these results. Interestingly, when the relation
among the keys is specied as a black box, no chosen-relation security
is feasible. By translating this result to non-black box relations, either
no known-input security is feasible, or we can recognize any obfuscated
relation by a xed set of rules, or we can build a PKC. Any of these three
results is quite interesting in itself.
1 Preamble
Children often use adaptive rules in their games. Indeed, ruling a game is usually
the result of a learning process. There are also common practices to motivate
games with adaptive rules. Irrespective on whether this is good or bad, computer
security often relies on security patches, or new signatures in anti-virus systems,
which appear once an exploit is known.
In cryptography, security denitions followed a similar learning process. We
often have to rule out some specic attacks once we realize that no security is
feasible because there exists generic attacks. For instance, to model resistance
to chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA), we dene a game where the adversary can
query a ciphertext to a decryption oracle. As he must distinguish whether a
given ciphertext c encrypts a message m0 or a message m1, a rst rule says that
he cannot query the decryption oracle after c is determined. This is the security
against \lunchtime attack" [30]. Another rule allows further queries, conditioned
to that they are not equal to c. This is the standard CCA security [15,16]. Clearly,
no security is feasible without this rule.
A more complicated case is the one of related-key attacks (RKA) [6,7,28]. In
this model, the adversary can query a plaintext and a transformation of the key.
There are many attacks based on some weird transformations. In Appendix A.1,
we describe the attacks by Biham [8], Bellare and Kohno [3], Harris [22,23], and
Bernstein [5]. These attacks show that no RKA security is feasible without some
specic rules making these attacks forbidden. To rule them out, the easy way
is to add some drastic rules such as the transformation must be of the form
k 7! k  . But the question of a minimal set of rules allowing any random-
looking transformation remains.
In this work, we describe the security with adaptive rules as a game, with a
challenger, an adversary, and a ruler trying to catch the malicious behavior of
the adversary. The game consists of playing with an oracle to evaluate a keyed
primitive fK . So, we distinguish known-input security, where the inputs to the
oracle are random, to chosen-input security, where the adversary selects the
input. Ruling out malicious behaviors means to restrict to adversaries making
chosen inputs indistinguishable from known inputs.
The Paper At A Glance
Setting. We consider a keyed primitive denoted fK(q). This primitive is set up
with a key K and one bit b (which is supposed to be a hard-core bit of K, as
we will explain later). An example to consider is given by fK(q) = Enc'(K)(x)
for q = ('; x), where Enc is some encryption function. In this case, the input '
is referred to as relation ' (in reminiscence of related -key security) and x as a
plaintext.
We further consider the problem of guessing whether the coin b is a Head
Or a Tail, i.e., the HOT game. In this game, the adversary ignores the key but
he can make oracle queries to fK . We distinguish between the case where q is
chosen by the adversary and the case where q is selected based on a random
distribution D, i.e., chosen-input attack vs. known-input attack.
On nding a minimal set of rules for related-key security. In related-key security,
the adversary must provide a relation to the challenger. In a black-box model,
this relation is provided in terms of access to an oracle (i.e., the inner structure
of the relation is not visible). Otherwise, relations must be specied in terms
of an executable code (or Turing machine). Since there is a double-exponential
number of relations, we must consider only relations that can be implemented by
a short code and specify a distribution for known-relation security. Alternatively,
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we must substantially restrict the set of relations, e.g., by taking the set T+ of
all translations '(K) = K +, given a group law \+" over the key-space. Even
in that case, a separation between known-relation security and chosen-relation
security induces a public-key cryptosystem.
Dening a sound model for related-key security appears to be challeng-
ing as many \trivial attacks" using convoluted relations have been discovered,
e.g., [6,7]. For this reason, we introduce the notion of game with rules which
could be updated incrementally. Indeed, our security game comprises an adver-
sary, a challenger, and a ruler who performs a checking on that the adversary
did not select unauthorized relations. This model is particularly useful to show
the nonexistence of rules making security feasible.
Our focus. In this paper, we consider a restricted chosen-input model. Thus, we
look at chosen inputs that are indistinguishable from the random ones present
in known-input models.
Known-input security vs. certain chosen-input security. We observe that having
a separation between known-input security and restricted chosen-input security
yields the ability to construct a public-key cryptosystem. I.e., if we have a prim-
itive secure against known-input attacks but vulnerable to some chosen-input
attack, the cryptosystem's design is based on the primitive and it exploits the
attack. In the Minicrypt world [26], public-key cryptography does not exist but
symmetric cryptography does. So, therein we cannot have any separation. So,
known-input security implies our restrictive chosen-input security.
Black-box vs. non black-box related-key security. We further show that the sep-
aration actually holds for related-key security when relations are considered as
black-boxes. To remove black-box relations, we consider obfuscated white boxes.
Since it is unlikely that one could build a cryptosystem from a block cipher and
an adversary, we deduce that either no known-relation security is possible, or
there is a generic way to break obfuscation schemes for relations.
Our contribution concisely. In this paper we formalize the notion of ruler/arbiter
of a security game and the security notions linked to this. We prove that a
gap between known-input security and permissive chosen-input security implies
public-key cryptography. We show that the gap exists for related-key security in
a black-box model. When removing the black-boxes using an obfuscation scheme,
we deduce that either no known-relation security is feasible, or any obfuscation
scheme is weak, or it makes a public-key cryptosystem.
Structure of this paper. In Section 2, we introduce some meta-security notions
via the (formal) concepts of game, ruler, permissive ruler, known-input attack,
and chosen-input attack. In Section 3 we show that a gap between known-input
security and permissive chosen-input security implies public-key cryptography.
In Section 4 we extend the Harris attack to break any cipher using related keys
and we show that no permissive ruler can detect it when the relations used are
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black-boxes. We further discuss on extending this with obfuscation and on the
diculty to identity the exact rules to make related-key security sound.
Related work. Related-key attacks independently appeared in Biham's [6,7] and
Knudsen's [28]. Basically, an adversary has access to some encryption/decryption
black boxes which relate to each other by some known- or chosen-relations by
the adversary. Concretely, the adversary makes ('; x) queries for a relation '
and a plaintext x and gets back Enc'(K)(x), i.e., the encryption of x under key
'(K). (In chosen ciphertext attacks, the adversary can query ('; y) to get back
Enc 1'(K)(y).) In the literature, cryptanalysts have looked for relations ' such
that the adversary could get an advantage in this model. Although the relevance
of this model has been controversial, it is widely admitted that, for some appli-
cations, these attacks can pose a real threat. Indeed, in some applications, keys
can be updated in a way which might be known (or inuenced) by an adversary.
To make the attack model as general as possible, it is tempting to allow any
relation. Unfortunately, we can then show that no security is feasible without
more restrictions.
Bellare and Kohno [3] studied a formal model for related-key security. Their
model had to be relative to a set of authorized permutations. It works in the
ideal cipher model (that is, when the block cipher is random and only usable
through specic oracle accesses) and when the relations selected by the adversary
are not cipher-dependent (that is, to evaluate a relation, we shall not have any
access to the encryption or decryption oracles). They proposed some sucient
conditions for identifying authorized relations. These results were extended by
Farshim, Paterson, Albrecht, and Watson [18] by allowing relations to depend
on the ideal cipher but obeying extra conditions.
Lucks [29] studied related-key security based on partial transformations, i.e.,
relations modifying only a part of the key. Another approach by Goldenberg and
Liskov [19] shows that related-key security can be achieved by (and can make)
a related-key pseudorandom bit. Bellare and Cash [2] constructed one by using
public-key cryptography techniques.
Other similar existential results exist. For instance, Pietrzak [31] shows that
for any k  2, either there exists a secure key agreement protocol working with
k messages, or the sequential composition of (k   1)-adaptively secure PRF is
a k-adaptively secure PRF. (k-adaptive security refers to adversaries allowed to
make up to k round of queries where queries in the same round as selected at
the same time.) So, in the Minicrypt world where we have no key agreement
protocol, sequential composition transform non-adaptive security into adaptive
security.
Notations. In what follows, we will consider asymptotic security notions.1 That
is, cryptographic algorithms and parameters shall depend on a security param-
1 Exact, i.e., not asymptotic, security could also be considered, but it would require
heavier notations.
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eter . Specically, these algorithm run in time which is polynomial in . Ad-
versaries defeating the security requirements do so via computations that are
polynomial in terms of . For readability, the parameter  will be omitted from
certain notations.
A function negl is negligible if for any integer d we have negl() 2 O( d). A
function whose inverse is polynomially bounded is not negligible.
We will be using the Hoeding bound [24]: for X1; : : : ; Xn independent iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables of expected value p and
t  0,
Pr
"
1
n
nX
i=1
Xi  p+ t
#
 e 2nt2 ; Pr
"
1
n
nX
i=1
Xi  p  t
#
 e 2nt2
In the special case where t = jp  12 j, we obtain that the majority of X1; : : : ; Xn
does not correspond to the most likely value of X1 with probability at most
e 2n(p 
1
2 )
2
. This will be referred to as the Cherno bound [10].
2 Ruler-Based Security Models
We dene here some meta-security notions, encapsulated in the security game
 F (A; ) for a primitive F . These notions comprise the adversary A, the chal-
lenger C, the advantage that A may have at winning this game, and a special
measure of the latter called uniform advantage.
Keyed Primitive. Throughout this paper, we consider a \keyed primitive" F
dened by the following: 1. a generator Gen generating a coin b 2 f0; 1g and
some K 2 K, i.e., (b;K) Gen; 2. an algorithm fK(q) taking as input a key K,
a \query" q 2 D. The function fK may be probabilistic. Again, a natural choice
for related-key security would be to consider fK(q) = Enc'(K)(x) for q = ('; x),
where Enc is some encryption function. Here, ' is called a \relation".
Denition 1 (The  F (A; ) Security Game). Given a keyed primitive F
depending on some security parameter , we consider a game  F (A; ) between
two principles called an adversary A and a challenger C. The adversary is arbi-
trary. The challenger is specied in the game. Both are probabilistic interactive
Turing machines running with expected polynomial time in terms of . The game
consists of setting up both A and C with some independent random coins  and
C (respectively), then running an interactive protocol between them and waiting
for a nal outcome  F (A; ) = 0 or 1. If the outcome is 0, we say that the
adversary wins.
The advantage of the adversary is
Adv F (A; ) = Pr;C[ F (A; ) = 0]  Pr;C[ F (A; ) = 1]
where the probability goes over all random coins. We say that F is   -secure if
for any A, Adv F (A; ) is negligible in terms of . The uniform advantage of
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the adversary is
UAdv F (A; ) = minC

Pr

[ F (A; ) = 0]  Pr

[ F (A; ) = 1]

In the denition, the advantage is the dierence between the probability to win
and the probability to lose. We could have taken Pr[ F (A; ) = 0]   12 as
a denition. We prefer our formalism since it facilitates the extension to games
producing a third possible outcome. And, indeed, we are going to consider games
which can abort, so the outcome could be 0, 1, or abort.
We also dened the notion of uniform advantage as it is easy to amplify (as
shown in Lemma 2 below). It captures high advantages whatever the coins used
by the challenger.
Head-Or-Tail game. We consider the following Head-Or-Tail game (HOT), which
we denote by HOTF (A):
1. Using fresh coins from C , run Gen to generate b and K.
2. RunA() iteratively and answer its queries qi by yi = fK(qi). I.e., q1 = A(),
q2 = A(y1; ), q3 = A(y1; y2; ), ... If fK is probabilistic, running yi = fK(qi)
assumes independent coins which are taken from C .
3. Whenever A stops making queries and outputs a bit , stop and yield b .
I.e., A wins if  = b.
The primitive is stateless in the sense that queries fK(q) produce a distribution
which only depends on q throughout the execution of the game. The last output
of the adversary is a bit denoted by . The primitive F is secure if no adversary
can guess b by playing with fK . Later, we use b set as a function ofK (a hard-core
bit of K).
Amplication of uniform advantages. The notion of uniform advantage relates
to advantages that do not depend on the random coins of the challenger. This
notion is convenient for amplifying an advantage of  d to 1 negl. The following
lemma shows this exactly.
Lemma 2 (Amplication Lemma). If a polynomial adversary A has a uni-
form advantage " in the HOTF game, where " = 
( d) for some d, then we can
build a polynomial adversary with uniform advantage 1   negl() in the HOTF
game.
This extends to any other game in which the following holds: 1. the challenger
is stateless (that is, its state before any query is fully determined by its random
tape C); 2. the outcome of the game is a function g(; C); with C being the
random coins of C and  being the bit eventually produced by the adversary.
Proof. Due to the assumptions, the adversary has two possible choices for the
output . Furthermore, for any C ,A's choice  leads to b = 0 with probability
p  1+"2 over . We dene an adversary who simulates the adversaryA repeatedly
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k = 2d+1 times and who nally outputs  to be the majority of A's outputs
. Since the challenger is stateless and the advantage is uniform, whatever the
key and the unique coins used by the challenger, every iteration of the adversary
makes independent s such that b = 0 with probability p. Due to the Cherno
bound [10], with probability less than e 2k(p 
1
2 )
2  e  k"22  e 
() = negl(),
the majority  of all s is such that b  6= 0. ut
Known-input security. We now dene the notion of known-input security. For
that, we need to specify the distribution of randomly selected relations.
Denition 3 (D-known-input (KI) security). Consider a distribution D
over D which is polynomially samplable. We say that the adversary A in the
HOTF (A) game is D-KI if each of his queries q is either identical to a previous
query2 or a freshly sampled random query following the distribution D. These
queries are sampled independently.
We say that F is HOT-KI-secure for D if for all D-KI adversary the advantage
in the corresponding HOT game is negligible.
Rulers. When dening restricted chosen-input security, we will introduce some
new rules in the game which will be enforced by an extra process called \ruler".
Typically, we will require that inputs chosen by the adversary are indistinguish-
able from inputs sampled in a known-input attack.
Given a keyed primitive F as in the HOT game, we will dene the RHOT
game involving a ruler. A ruler is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine
R which produces a bit given a possible view of the challenger.
Denition 4 (Rulers and Ruled Games). Given the list q1; : : : ; qn of queries
from the adversary and the random coins C of the challenger in the HOT game,
ruler R computes a bit denoted ~b = R(q1; : : : ; qn; C ; R). The ruled-game RHOT
runs as follows:
Game RHOTF (A;R):
1: pick R at random
2: run the HOT game as before until  is set, denote q1; : : : ; qn the queries from
A and C the coins of the challenger
3: ~b R(q1; : : : ; qn; C ; R)
4: if ~b = 1 then
5: return abort
6: else
7: return b 
8: end if
When ~b = 0, we say that A follows the rules of R. Otherwise, we say that R
rules over A.
The advantage of A for ruler R is
AdvRHOTF (A;R) = Pr[RHOTF (A;R) = 0]  Pr[RHOTF (A;R) = 1]
2 Since F may be probabilistic, it may be useful to repeat a query.
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We say that F is RHOT-secure for a class of rulers if for all A there is a ruler
R in this class such that AdvRHOTF (A;R) is negligible.
The ruler captures the common practice of encompassing known threats in a
model for attack-detection. I.e., in related-key security, some \trivial attacks"
breaking any cipher can be deployed. (See Appendix A.1.) However, these attacks
use specic relations which can be added to the security model, i.e., for the ruler
to check on the y if such \trivial attacks" are taking place.
The advantage is
AdvRHOTF (A;R) = Pr[RHOTF (A;R) = 0]  Pr[RHOTF (A;R) = 1]
= Pr[~b = 0](Pr[ = bj~b = 0]  Pr[ 6= bj~b = 0])
That is, this is the advantage given that the game follows the rules dened by the
ruler, multiplied by the probability to follow the rules. It is necessary to consider
the probability to follow the rules since an adversary with high advantage but
almost never in the legal case would certainly be insignicant for security.
The HOT game can be seen as a RHOT game in which the ruler would always
output 0, i.e.,R would allow every \behavior" ofA. Conversely, a ruler answering
1 too often would make F trivially secure, i.e., if all is forbidden, then no attack
is possible. Thus, to make security non-trivial we require rulers that are, in some
sense, permissive, i.e., they allow the adversary to play as long as we cannot see
any malicious behavior.
Denition 5 (Permissive ruler). Given a keyed primitive F and a polynomi-
ally samplable distribution D over the set D of inputs, we say that a ruler R is
permissive for D if for any D-KI adversary A, the probability that R rules over
A in the RHOT game is negligible.
The above denition says that D-permissive rulers allow adversaries to select in-
puts by samplingD. Clearly, the AND/OR of a polynomial number of permissive
rules is also a permissive rule.
Chosen-input security. We now give a restricted notion of chosen-input (CI)
security called PCI.
Denition 6 (D-permissive chosen-input (PCI) security). Given a keyed
primitive F , consider a polynomially samplable distribution D over the set D of
inputs. We say that F is RHOT-PCI-secure for D if it is RHOT-secure for the
class of all permissive rulers for D. I.e., for any adversary A, there is a D-
permissive ruler R such that AdvRHOT(A;R) is negligible.
So, we only rule out CI attacks whose behavior can be distinguished from the
one of KI attacks.
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3 The PCI/KI Gap Includes Public-Key Cryptography
3.1 Our Result
We show that if there exists a non-adaptive CI-adversaryA successfully attacking
a keyed primitive in front of any D-permissive ruler R and if the primitive resists
KI attacks, then we can construct a cryptosystem from F and A.
Lemma 7. Consider a keyed primitive F over the key domain K in which the
generator Gen produces balanced coin b. Assume that F is HOT-KI-secure for a
distribution D. If there is a non-adaptive adversary A in the RHOT game with
advantage 1  negl() for all permissive rulers for D, then we have a public-key
cryptosystem dened by the following:
{ The key generation: pick a secret key  and the public key q = (q1; : : : ; qn) 
A(), the non-adaptive queries by A.
We write (; q) = PKGen(). I.e.,  is the secret key and q is the public one.
{ The encryption of a bit : pick C = (0C ; 
1
C ; : : :) randomly and do: (b;K) 
Gen(0C), y  (fK(qi; iC))i=1;:::;n, and e   b.
We write (y; e) = PKEncq(; C).
{ The decryption of (y; e): do b0  A(y; ) e.
We write b0 = PKDec(y; e).
This cryptosystem is correct and secure.
This lemma uses an adversary A producing its set of queries q non-adaptively,
which is the public key. Then, the encryption of  is the answers to the queries
(with a fresh (b;K) and some fresh coins for fK) together with b. The bit b can
be guessed byA for decryption. The high advantage ofAmakes the cryptosystem
correct. Any decryption algorithm E would imply a permissive ruler to detect
the behavior of A. Since A cannot be ruled over, the cryptosystem is secure.
Proof. Let us assume that an adversary as above exists. Let q and y be the vec-
tors of query-inputs and query-outputs to and from the challenger, respectively.
PKDec(y; e) =  is equivalent to b = A(y; ), i.e., to A winning in the HOT
game. By denition, for any permissive ruler R, we have
1 negl() = Adv(A;R) = Pr[R accepts] (1  2Pr[PKDec(y; e) 6= jR accepts])
We apply this to the ruler R who always accepts. We obtain that the probability
that (y; e) does not decrypt to  is negligible. This holds for any . So, the
cryptosystem satises correctness. So, what remains to be proven is its security.
Consider some algorithm E(q; y; e) trying to decrypt (y; e) given a public key
q, and let "q = Pr[E(q;PKEncq(; C)) = ]  12 over a random C and , for the
public key q xed. We want to show that E("q) is negligible over , for q = A().
We construct rulers Rd(q; C ; R) based on E as follows. For a number of
k = 2d+1 random C(j) and j , encrypt j under coins C(j) with public key q
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and get the ciphertext (yj ; ej) = PKEncq(j ; C(j)). Then, count for how many
j's we have j = E(q; yj ; ej). If this number is above the threshold t = k( 12+ d),
then rule over A. Note that this ruler makes no use of C . It is just testing the
public key q and it aborts if E(q; :; :) breaks this with an advantage that is too
large. We will show that Rd is permissive and deduce that it rules over A with
negligible probability. Consequently, E(")   d + negl(). As it holds for all
d, we conclude that E(") is negligible.
We rst show thatRd is permissive. We consider an arbitraryD-KI adversary
A0 generating n KI queries q0 = (q01; : : : ; q0n), receiving the responses y0 based on
some coins C , and producing a nal bit 0. We want to show that Pr[Rd(q0; C) =
1] = negl(). (We recall that the outcome 00 is not provided to the ruler.) To
do so, we must estimate "q0 .
For this, we construct another adversary A00 who makes the same queries q0
as A0 but computes his nal 00 in a special way. We dene A00 as follows: A00(00)
simulates A0(0) with some fresh coins 0 taken from 00, sets q00 = q0 and gets
the responses y00 = y0 based on some coins C . Then, it picks some random bit e
and computes 1 = E(q0; y0; e) e. Note that for q0 xed, if b is the bit generated
by Gen from C we have 1 = b with probability 12 + "q0 . In addition to this,A00 picks a random  and computes 2 = E(q0;PKEncq0()) . For q0 xed, we
have 2 = 0 with probability
1
2 + "q0 . The nal answer is 
00 = 1  2. So, we
have 00 = b with probability 12 + 2"
2
q0 , which is the probability for A00 to win
the HOTF (A00) game. Clearly, AdvHOTF (A00) = 4E("2q0) over the random choice
of 0 and q0 = A0(0). Since A00 is a D-KI adversary, due to D-KI security, we
obtain that E("2q0) is negligible.
LetB be the event that "2q0   2d 2 for d xed. Since Pr[:B]  2d+2E("2q0),
we have that Pr[:B] is negligible. So, B holds except in negligible cases. When
B holds, we have "q0   d 1. The Hoeding bound [24] deduces that Rd aborts
with a probability bounded by e 2(1 
 1)2 , which is negligible. So, the overall
probability that Rd aborts on queries q0 is negligible when B holds, and other
cases are negligible. So, Rd aborts on queries made by an arbitrary KI adversary
A0 with negligible probability. Therefore, Rd is permissive.
We now go back to the adversary A using the permissive ruler Rd. Due
to our assumptions, Rd rules over A with negligible probability. If "   d,
then by applying same reasoning as above, we obtain that the probability for the
adversary A to pass the ruler's test is less than e 2("d 1)2 , which is negligible.
Since Rd rules over A with negligible probability, the probability that "   d
is negligible. So, we must have E(")   d + negl(). We deduce then that
Pr[E(q; y;   b) = ]   12 = O( d) for a random public key q, a random K,
and a random .
We apply this result for every d and obtain that Pr[E(q;PKEncq(; C)) =
]  12 is negligible for any  and any polynomial E . Therefore, the cryptosystem
is secure. ut
Extension to adaptive adversaries. Clearly, this result extends to adaptive adver-
saries but with a cryptosystem replaced by a public cryptography protocol [32].
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Namely, the encryption becomes interactive, but it can still be carried out with
public information. I.e., Alice starts with a message m and a public key; Bob
starts with a secret key and ends with m, but m remains private. We conclude
this part as follows.
Theorem 8. Consider a keyed primitive F . Assume that F is HOT-KI-secure
for a given distribution D. If there exists an adversary A in the RHOT game with
advantage 1 negl() for the class of D-permissive rulers, then we can construct
a public cryptography protocol based on F and A.
The Minicrypt case. Using the Minicrypt hypothesis [26] that public-key cryp-
tosystems do not exist but one-way functions do, security in the known-relations
model implies security in the chosen-relations model with permissive rulers in
the following two cases:
{ in a weak form in the sense that it is ensured that no adversary has an
advantage 1  negl();
{ in a uniform form in the sense that it is ensured that no adversary has a
uniform advantage 1=Poly() (due to Lemma 2).
Assuming that doing public-key cryptography from symmetric cryptography
is impossible (which is supported by Rudich [32]), we obtain that known-input
security implies permissive chosen-input (weak or uniform) security, for all F
based on symmetric cryptography. If we do have known-input security, for any
CI adversary, there must be a permissive ruler making its advantage negligible.
3.2 Concrete Constructions of Cryptosystems
As a nice example of application of Lemma 7, we show that we can obtain the
ElGamal cryptosystem by this result.
Let a family (G; g; n; h) of tuples, with G being a nite Abelian group,
g being an element of prime order n, and h being a Boolean function such
that Pr[h(gx) = 0]   12 is negligible when x 2 f0; : : : ; n   1g. We assume the
following facts: 1. there exist algorithms which are polynomially bounded and
compute products and inverses in G; 2. logn is polynomially bounded; 3. there
is a polynomially bounded algorithm to compute h(x), for x in the subgroup hgi
generated by g.
We dene F as follows: Gen picks K and denes b = h(gK). Then, fK(q) =
qK . We consider the uniform distribution D over hgi. A chosen input attack
could select q = g and deduce b from the response fK(q) but this can be ruled
out by the rule saying that q = g is not allowed (indeed, it does not look like
random). Later, we will randomize q so that it cannot be detected by permissive
rules. In relation to Section 3.1, we have the following result.
Lemma 9. If the decisional Die-Hellman problem is hard in (G; g; n), then
f is HOT-secure against D-KI attacks.
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Proof. In KI attack settings, the adversary gets random (qi; q
K
i ) pairs.
When n is prime, it reduces to the case where a single pair is given. This is
so since the adversary could sample other pairs with the same distribution by
simply raising the unique pair to some random power. If the decisional Die-
Hellman problem is hard in G, then |given (g; q; qK)| it is hard to infer h(gK).
So, f resists to D-known-relation attacks. ut
After referring to known-input security, we now elaborate on chosen-input
attack. A CI adversary choosing q = g with  random is indistinguishable from
the KI case. However, such adversary can easily compute b = h(y
1
 ) given y =
qK . So, we are in the situation where we can construct a public-key cryptosystem,
following Lemma 7. (The public key is one q. The secret key is  such that q = g.
To encrypt , we pick a random K and compute both y = qK and e =   b.
To decrypt (y; e), we compute e  h(y 1 ).) So, we obtain a kind of ElGamal
cryptosystem [17], or some hybrid construction based on the Die-Hellman key
exchange [13].
4 Related-Key Security
We apply here our approach to model (in)security for the case of related-key at-
tacks. We rst present previous approaches to this. We then extend our model to
black-box relations to support related-key attacks. Next, we show that we cannot
reach security in this model for the uniform distribution among all permutations
over K. Finally, we discuss on obfuscation.
Similar results would hold for Key-Dependent Input (KDI) security. For this,
we would dene fK('; x) = EncK('(K)) (See Appendix B). Also, these are
special cases for leakage-resilience as dened by fK('; x) = '(K;x).
4.1 The Black-Box Approach
In this section, we consider a black-box model, in which relations are provided
by the adversary in terms of a black-box oracle access.
Denition 10 (Black-box adversary, black-box ruler). A black-box adver-
sary A for the RHOT game, denoted as a BBRHOT-adversary, is an adversary
who provides relations 'i in terms of a stateless oracle access. The challenger
(and the ruler) can freely query each oracle dened by the adversary. A primitive
F is BBRHOT-PCI-secure for D if for any CI-adversary there is a D-permissive
ruler making the advantage negligible.
We dene F by fK('; x) = e'(K)(x) for a keyed function e and b = b(K) for a
nonzero linear function b. The domain D of ('; x) queries is SKM, the product
of the set SK of permutations ' over K and the domainM of x. We show that
BBRHOT-PCI-security for the uniform distribution over D is not possible. For
this, we show that there is a CI-adversary which can break any keyed function
e in the HOT game, and that this adversary passes any permissive ruler in the
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black-box model. That is, by extending the Harris attack [22,23], we mount a
key-bit recovery attack in the black-box relation model.
Theorem 11. Given a keyed function eK(x) and a nonzero linear function b(K)
over the domain K of K and the domainM of x, we dene a keyed primitive F
via (K; b) Gen and fK('; x) = e'(K)(x), with K 2 K, b = b(K), and ' 2 SK
a permutation over K. We assume that (k 7! ek(x))x2M is a collision-resistant
family of functions over K.3
If one-way functions exist, there is a non-adaptive polynomially bounded PCI-
adversary A in the BBRHOT game for the uniform distribution D over D, A
having a uniform advantage of 1  negl().
This theorem shows that some attacks exist for this distribution D. They cannot
be detected by analyzing the chosen-relations in a black-box manner. Therefore,
permissive related-key security is not possible in a black-box setting.
Proof. Lemma 12 below shows that there is one adversaryA, using a single query
('; x), with uniform advantage in the HOT game being 12 negl(). So, we can use
the Amplication Lemma 2 with k =  iterations. Lemma 12 further says that
for C xed, ' selected by A is a PRP while x is uniform and independent. The
amplication uses independent queries with same distribution. So, a permissive
ruler in the black box model cannot rule over the amplied adversary. ut
Lemma 12. We assume a keyed primitive e such that (k 7! ek(x))x2M is a
collision-resistant family of functions over K. Let b be a nonzero linear function
from K to f0; 1g. If one-way functions exist, there is a polynomially bounded
adversary A using a single query ('; x) in the HOT game with uniform advantage
1
2   negl().
Furthermore, ' and x are independent, ' is a PRP, and x is uniform.
Proof. Essentially, we construct an adversary by using the Harris [22,23] attack,
but we obfuscate the relation and the leaking information. This latter adversary
is using a single CI ('; x) and a linear bit b(K). This simplies the HOT game
as follows:
Game HOTF (A):
1: initialize A with some random coins 
2: set K 2 K at random
3: ('; x) A()
4: y  e'(K)(x)
5:   A(y; )
6: return   b(K)
The uniform advantage UAdvHOTF (A) of A is UAdvHOT(A) = minK 2Pr[ =
b(K)]  1.
We dene gx(K) = eK(x). Let " be a xed vector such that b(") = 1.
3 I.e., given a random x, it is hard to nd k 6= k0 such that ek(x) = ek0(x). This could
be the case, e.g., whenM is much larger than K.
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Given  2 SK, a Boolean function F over M, and x 2 M, we dene
bit;F;x(K) = F  gx  (K), a Boolean function extracting a bit of K and
';F;x(K) =
8<:(K
0) for K 0 2 fK;K  "g s:t:
bit;F;x(K
0) = b(K) if bit;F;x(K) 6= bit;F;x(K  ")
(K) otherwise
Note that ';F;x is a permutation. Indeed, given y = ';F;x(K) we can recover
the pair fK;K"g by computing  1(y) and its XOR to ". Then, we can gure
out whether bit;F;x(K) = bit;F;x(K  ") by computing the two bits. If they
are equal, then K =  1(y). If they are dierent, K is the only one such that
bit;F;x(
 1(y)) = b(K).
Let 1 be a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) over K, and let F2 be a
Boolean pseudorandom function (PRF) with domainM.
We dene the adversary A for the game HOTF . A picks 1; 2; x from 
and denes ' = '1 ;F2 ;x. The only query made by A is ('; x). Then, using
the response y = e'(K)(x) = gx('(K)), we dene  = A(y; ) = F2(y) =
F2  gx('(K)) as the nal output.
Since 1 resp. 2 are only used inside 1 resp. F2 within the algorithm of
A, then the computations of  and F can be outsourced to some oracle and A
needs not  any more. Since  is a PRP and F is a PRF, the outcome of the
(polynomially bounded) game is indistinguishable from the resulting outcome
if we were to use a random pair (; F ) with uniform distribution. We can thus
make the assumption that  is a uniformly distributed permutation and that
F is a randomly distributed function, and assume that ';F;x is dened from 
and F instead of 1 and F2 .
In Lemma 13, we show that for any x, the relation ';F;x is a PRP. So, '
is a PRP independent from the uniform x. Furthermore, Lemma 13 shows that
 = b(K) with probability close to 34 when K is xed. So, the uniform advantage
is close to 12 . ut
Lemma 13. Let (gx)x2M be a collision-resistant family of functions over K,
" 2 M, and b be a linear form over M such that b(") = 1. Let  be a random
Boolean permutation and F be a random function on M. Given x, we dene
'(K) = (K 0) where K 0 2 fK;K  "g is such that F  gx  (K 0) = b(K) if
F  gx  (K) 6= F  gx  (K  ") and K 0 = K otherwise.
Given a xed key x, ' is indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed per-
mutation.
Given k 2 K xed and x uniformly distributed. Pr[F  gx('(k)) = b(k)] =
3
4   negl().
Proof. Given x xed, we consider a distinguisher R playing with the ' oracle.
Let E be the event that R queries ' with two keys K and K 0 such that K 6= K 0,
K 6= K 0", and gx((K)); gx((K")); gx((K 0)); gx((K 0")) are not pairwise
dierent. Clearly, this adversary translates to a polynomial algorithm to nd
collisions on g with success probability Pr[E]. But, by underlying assumptions,
this must be negligible. So, we assume that E does not occur in the execution
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of R. Let S denote the union of all fK;K  "g of all K's which are queried by
R to '. We obtain that gx   is injective on S.
We say that two permutations  and 0 are equivalent if for all K in S, the
two unordered pairs f(K); (K ")g and f0(K); 0(K ")g are the same. We
note that ' is always equivalent to . We will show that if we select  in a given
equivalence class Class and pick F at random, then ' restricted to S will be a
uniformly distributed element of Class. Indeed, the ordering of a pair for ' is
locally dened by the ordering of  on the same pair and the values of F related
to this pair. In addition to this, if we ip the order for  and we complement
the two related bits in F on this pair, then we obtain the inverse order for '.
(Since gx is injective on S, note that the F values to ip are independent from
the others.) Therefore the mapping (; F ) 7! ' is balanced for  2 Class and F
random. So, it is balanced over the permutation set. Therefore, ' is uniformly
distributed.
The ' construction is such that F  gx('(K)) = b(K) when F  gx  (K) 6=
F  gx  (K  ") and only for half of the K's in the other case. Given a xed
k, let Ek be the event that gx((k)) = gx((k  ")). Since  transforms the
(k; k  ") pair into a random pair of dierent keys, we have Pr[Ek] = pcoll
where pcoll = Pr[gx(K) = gx(K
0)jK 6= K 0] when K and K 0 are independent
and uniformly distributed. If Ek does not occur, the probability over F that
F  gx('(k)) = b(k) corresponds to the case where the pair is mapped by F to
dierent bits or to two bits equal to b(k), so
Pr[F  gx('(k)) = b(k)j:Ek] = 3
4
Similarly,
Pr[F  gx('(k)) = b(k)jEk] = 1
2
So,
Pr[F  gx('(k)) = b(k)] = 3
4
(1  pcoll) + 1
2
pcoll =
3
4
  1
4
pcoll
ut
4.2 On Obfuscation
Theorem 11 relies on obfuscating the Harris attack behind pseudorandom per-
mutations and functions so that no ruler would recognize the structure of the
relation in a black-box manner. In this construction, we have ' = '1 ;F2 ;x.
When moving to a non-black-box model, relations must be specied in terms of
a code which could try to obfuscate the relation as well. Namely, the adversary
could provide some code Obf(') obfuscated by some algorithm Obf so that there
is an execution algorithm Exe such that for all x, Exe(Obf('); x) = Exe('; x).
Assuming that Obf('1 ;F2 ;x) and Obf(') for ' random cannot be distin-
guished, then Theorem 8 says that we can construct a public-key cryptosystem
based on F and Obf('1 ;F2 ;x). Namely, a public key would be the obfuscated
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relation and the secret key would consist of the  values. Since this construction
is unlikely to be feasible due to the separation between symmetric cryptography
and public-key cryptography, we deduce that for any Obf, there must be a ruler
to tell Obf('1 ;F2 ;x) and Obf(') apart.
We could try to obfuscate ' using white-box cryptography [11,12] or any
obfuscation mechanism [1,25]. Our result shows that there must be a generic
way to defeat these techniques in that case. So, it is likely to be a hard task to
nd the appropriate ruler.
5 Conclusion
We have formalized security notions in which the adversary tries to win against
a challenger while a ruler is watching him. This gave denitions for known-input
and permissive chosen-input security. We have shown that a gap between these
notions implies a public cryptography protocol construction. As for related-key
security, we have shown that the gap exists when providing relations in terms
of black-boxes. When removing black-boxes, we deduced that all obfuscation
schemes can be defeated by a ruler, or we can construct a public-key cryp-
tosystem from a block cipher, pseudorandom permutations, and the obfuscation
scheme, or no known-relation security exists.
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A On Related-Key Security
A.1 Some Attacks to be Ruled Over
We list here some non-dedicated attacks in related-key settings. The purpose of
this list is to keep in mind some necessary rules to be considered when developing
a feasible security model.
In a folklore attack, the adversary uses ` queries ('i; xi), i = 0; : : : ; `   1,
where ` is the key length and 'i(K) = K AND 1
` i0i. That is, 'i(K) consists
of the rst `   i bits of K padded with zeroes. Clearly, by getting one known
plaintext/ciphertext pair per black-box, an adversary can recover all bits of K
sequentially by exhaustive search with complexity O(`).
In 2003, Bellare and Kohno [3] proposed another similar attack in this model.
Essentially, they use ` related keys again (` being the key length). The permu-
tation 'i for i > 0 was dened as follows: if the ith bit of x is 1, then 'i(K)
is obtained from K by ipping the least signicant bit, otherwise 'i(K) = K.
(Assume that the least signicant bit lsb(K) is 0.) Additionally, '0(K) = K.
In a chosen plaintext attack, one could get yi = EncKi(x) for all i. If yi 6= y0,
it means that the ith bit of K0 is 1. Clearly, we recover again all bits in linear
time.
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Recently, Harris [22,23] proposed another attack which is similar to the
Bellare-Kohno [3] attack. Here, 'i;x(K) is either K or K  ei for ei = 0` i 110i
(i.e., K  ei is K with its ith bit ipped), depending on some condition related
to the least signicant bits (lsb) y = lsb(EncK(x)) and y
0 = lsb(EncKei(x)).
Namely, if y = y0, then 'i;x(K) = K. Otherwise, either y or y0 is equal to the
ith bit of K. If this is y then 'i;x(K) = K. Otherwise, 'i;x(K) = Kei. It is not
hard to realize that this denes a permutation 'i;x. The nice property is that
lsb(Enc'i;x(K)(x)) equals the ith bit of K with probability
3
4 over the random
choice of x. So, by statistical analysis, we can infer every bit by using several
related keys.
Even more recently, Bernstein [5] proposed a generic related-key distinguisher
using a single related key. The proposed relation is K 0 = EncK(0). Although it
is not a permutation, one can admit that it is still a one-way transformation for
which nding collisions is hard. The attack consists of encrypting 0 with key K
(say y0 = EncK(0)) and any plaintext x with key K
0 (say y = EncK0(x)) then
comparing Ency0(x) with y. The distinguisher has essentially an advantage of 1.
So far, it is not clear how this attack can be turned into a key recovery attack.
All these attacks could be seen as devastating in theory although they do
not seem to mean any endemic weakness for any cipher. What is in common
between all these attacks is that they are generic and they use some intricate
relations. Consequently, these relations must be explicitly forbidden by ad hoc
rules, i.e., arbiters should rule them over.
If the set of authorized permutations makes it possible to dene r related
keys, one could use a tradeo attack as proposed by Biham [8]. Essentially, one
could collect yi = EncKi(x) for all i then perform a multi-target exhaustive
search to recover one key out of r. This works with complexity O(2`=r). For
r = 2
`
2 , this is O(2 `2 ). For instance, if the transformations '(x) = x  c are
allowed for all c, we can mount a key recovery attack against any `-bit key
cipher with complexity O(2 `2 ). As another example, if only the transformation
'(x) = x + 1 mod 2` and its iterations are allowed, we obtain the same result.
In general, allowing r permutations and related keys makes it possible to use
the previous attack with space complexity O(r) and time complexity O(2`=r).
Fortunately, this attack has a super-polynomial complexity. So, in practice, we
are not threatened by this attack.
A.2 Previous Approaches for Related-Key Security
Due to the existence of related-key attacks breaking all ciphers by using special
relations (see Appendix A.1), sound security models for related-key security must
rule over attackers using these relations. Bellare-Kohno [3] devised an exhaustive
list of criteria including such allowed relations but his criteria only work in the
ideal cipher model. These relations must be in a set D such that the following
aspects are the case.
{ Output unpredictability: For any subset P of a (polynomially) large set
D and for any set X of keys of (polynomially) bounded size, the probability
over K 2U K that f'(K);' 2 Pg \X 6= ; is negligible.
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{ Collision resistance: For any subset P of a (polynomially) large set D, the
probability over K 2U K that #f'(K);' 2 Pg < #P is negligible.
Output unpredictability rules over attackers working with functions which cancel
too many bits. Since '(K) = K for many relations, collision resistance elimi-
nates the Bellare-Kohno attack and the Harris attack (see Appendix A.1). So,
these criteria eliminate all threats except the Bernstein [5] attack.4 (See Ap-
pendix A.1.) Bellare and Kohno prove that these two criteria are sucient to
prove security in the PRP-RKADEnc game in the ideal cipher model. This model
by itself discards Bernstein's attack, since relations cannot call the cipher itself.
What is satisfactory about their approach is that all polynomial attacks men-
tioned in Appendix A.1 are eliminated. As per [3], therein we could indeed show
that some secure block ciphers exist. What is not satisfactory about their ap-
proach is that all dedicated attacks in the literature are also eliminated because
they attack a cipher which is not in the ideal cipher model.
In [23], Harris proposed to dene related-key security in the standard model
but for tweakable encryption, in which the adversary would have to commit to a
set of allowed relations before he learns which tweak  is being used. Of course,
this set must be polynomially bounded. Otherwise, the adversary could decide
to allow 'i;x; for all  . Still, the relevance of this model to practice is debatable.
In [18], relations can invoke Enc and Enc 1 but there is the extra condition,
called oracle independence. It means that the adversary shall not produce ('1; x)
and '2 such that ('1(K); x) was queried to Enc or Enc
 1 during the computation
of '2(K). This condition rules over the Bernstein attack (due to '1(K) = K,
x = 0, and '2(K) = EncK(0)). It also eliminates the improved Harris attack (due
to '1(K) = Kei and '2 = 'i;x). However, oracle independence inherently relies
on the ideal cipher model: any instantiation may hide the fact that ('1(K); x)
is queried during the computation of '2(K); this is done by not querying it but
doing the computation locally instead.
In order to rule over the above improvement of the Harris attack in the
standard model (i.e., with no cipher oracle), we shall use our security model
based on rulers.
A.3 Using Rulers for Related-Key Security
The Bellare-Kohno [3] conditions for output unpredictability and collision resis-
tance could also cast as a class Jury of rulers. Indeed, we make Jury contain two
types of rulers, as follows.
{ For output unpredictability:
For each k 2 K, and for each integers d and i, we dene Rk;d;i as follows. Let
4 What is in common between the Harris attack [22,23] and the Bernstein one [5] is
that the relation is dened using the encryption itself. We could consider a related-
key attack in the ideal cipher model (a.k.a. the Shannon model), where the encryp-
tion/decryption would be given as an oracle-access. Having encryption/decryption
circumvented in an oracle makes it possible to prevent from using it in the denition
of elements of D.
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'i be the relation in the ith query by A. The ruler ought to make statistics
to estimate whether Pr['i(K) = k]   d (taken over random K), and it
ought to reject if this holds. (If there is no ith query, just output 0.)
{ For collision resistance:
For each d, i, j such that i < j, we dene Rd;i;j as follows. Let 'i be the
relation in the ith query of A and 'j be the relation in jth query of A. The
ruler ought to make statistics to estimate whether Pr['i(K) = 'j(K)]   d
(taken over random K) and it ought to reject, if this holds. (If there is no
ith query, just output 0.)
Namely, for output unpredictability, using n = 2d+1 samples K1; : : : ;Kn, the
ruler Rk;d;i aborts if the number of js such that 'i(Kj) = k goes beyond n2 d.
By using the Hoeding bound [24], we obtain that |if Pr['i(K) = k]   d|
then, with probability at most e 

2 , the rulerRk;d;i does not abort. If Pr['i(K) =
k]  14 d, the ruler aborts with probability at most e 

8 . If the set of relations
satises output unpredictability, then we know that Pr['i(K) = k] = O( d 1).
So, there is a 0 such that for all  > 0 and we have Pr['i(K) = k] <
1
4
 d.
Therefore, Rk;d;i aborts with negligible probability. This holds for all k, d, i.
Conversely, if the set does not satisfy output unpredictability, there must be
some k, d, and i such that Pr['i(K) = k]   d for innitely many 's. So,
Rk;d;i aborts with a probability which is not negligible.
The same arguments hold for collision resistance.
We note that all these rulers are polynomially bounded and permissive. In
this fashion, we rule over most of polynomial attacks from Appendix A.1 except
the Bernstein one. To rule over the Bernstein attack, we can use a ruler R who
looks whether there exists an (i; j)-pair such that yi = A1(cj ;K; ) (i.e., one
encryption-result equals one related key). This ruler rejects if this is the case.
Again, this is also polynomially bounded and permissive. So, we can rule over
all polynomial attacks from Appendix A.1 without using the Shannon model.
B Related-Key Model versus Key-Dependent Input
Model
As we can see, the problem with the Harris attack [22,23] lies in the way the
adversary makes the relation depends on the message to encrypt. Somehow, this
is a reminiscent of the key-dependent input (KDI) model. In the KDI model, a
query ' returns EncK('(K)).
Indeed, the Harris attack translates to our model in a straightforward way.
We dene 'i(K) = x as the smallest number such that lsb(EncK(x)) is the ith
bit of K. By making the 'i query to a KDI challenger, we obtain a ciphertext
whose least signicant bit is equal to the ith bit of K. This was already noticed
in Black-Rogaway-Shrimpton [9].
This could be even worse: when the key is smaller than the message block,
the '(K) = Enc 1K (K) query would yield K, as noticed by Halevi-Krawczyk [21].
They further observed that no deterministic encryption can be KDI-secure with
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respect to every set of allowed relations of cardinality 1. This is essentially due
to the Bernstein attack: setting '(K) = EncK(0), we can query ', 0 and its
result and check consistency of the outputs to mount a distinguisher.
Halevi-Krawczyk [21] then showed that for any well-spread function ' (i.e.
preimages are not too big), we can construct a deterministic encryption which is
KDI-secure with respect to the class f'g. We note that the well-spread condition
reminds our previous condition on colliding relations.
Halevi-Krawczyk [21] observed that we can achieve KDI-secure deterministic
encryption in the ideal cipher model by preventing key-dependent input functions
to depend on the ideal cipher. This is the same situation as in the related-key
model in Bellare-Kohno [3].
As we can see, the related-key attacks and key-dependent input attacks share
similar properties. Of course, we could combine them and propose a more general
framework. In this paper, we were rather inspired by the results on KDI-security
and want to see how to address related-key attacks.
In a recent result, Haitner-Holenstein [20] proved that if relations are treated
as black-boxes, there is no KDI-secure encryption based on a one-way permuta-
tion. We took this approach and look at what happens if related-key permuta-
tions were treated like black-boxes.
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